The post-…nancial crisis period, many corporate bankruptcies involve complicated, fragmented capital structures characterized by many layers of debt and complex legal entity structures with many subsidiaries. Why do capital structures evolve this way, given that they make distress more costly to resolve? I suggest an answer based on the notion that investors may disagree about the value of assets that back loans. When such disagreement exists, …rms have the incentive to exploit it by issuing claims that are targeted to subsets of the assets that investors are more optimistic about. This capital structure fragmentation can minimize the borrower's cost of funds ex-ante by maximizing creditors' perceived recoveries, but it can be socially ine¢ cient, because it creates costly valuation disputes in bankruptcy. I show that disagreement about collateral values can cause ine¢ cient liquidations. I also …nd that reorganizations, in which pre-bankruptcy creditors receive securities in the ongoing …rm, allows parties to continue "agreeing to disagree" about the value of their entitlements. This can promote settlement and reduce costly litigation over valuation, relative to selling the …rm as a going concern for cash.
Introduction
Many recent bankrupcy cases involve complicated negotiations exacerbated by complex capital structures. Consider the case of Energy Future Holdings. Following its leveraged buyout in 2007, the company was set up as a parent company with hundreds of subsidiaries, arranged into groups. One subsidiary group's (called the "E side") main asset was a regulated utility company. Another subsidiary group (called the "T side") held unregulated retail and wholesale power providers. Each subsidiary group was …nanced by …rst and second lien secured debt, and unsecured debt. The parent corporation, EFH, also had its own classes of unsecured debt. According to its CFO, all parties were in agreement that the best course of action was to keep the companies alive and convert debt into equity. But due to the complex nature of the capital structure and the persistent disagreements about the valuation of the two sides 1 , the company could not agree with its creditors about how to divide the equity in the reorganized company. EFH was forced to …le for bankruptcy after more than a year of unsuccessful negotiations. A reorganization plan was con…rmed after four years in bankruptcy and over $500 million in professional fees.
EFH is one of many recent examples involving complex capital structures and prolonged, expensive disputes involving valuation 2 . In this paper, I suggest that capital structures 1 As the CFO, Paul Keglevic, said in his a¢ davit to the Bankruptcy Court explaining the circumstances behind the bankruptcy …ling: "The Debtors'initial preference was to achieve a consensual, consolidated reorganization. There were advantages to such an outcome: EFH's current corporate form o¤ers cost synergies, there would be no risk of triggering deconsolidation-related tax liabilities, and potential disruption to EFH's businesses would be minimized. Under a consolidated framework, however, a signi…cant portion of EFIH, TCEH, and potentially EFH Corp. debt would have been converted into EFH Corp. equity, necessitating a need for a high degree of consensus among multiple creditor groups with claims to distinct asset classes...
it became clear that a consolidated transaction was not possible because the Debtors and their stakeholders were unable to bridge fundamental di¤erences in opinion on valuation and tax related issues. As a result, the Debtors turned their attention to developing a deconsolidation strategy. involved an 11 week trial to resolve a valuation dispute (Huebner and Schaible 2009) , and Adelphia Cable, which took 4.5 years to resolve complicated disputes between creditor groups across 250 legal entities, which like EFH's, and the valuation disputes they often produce, do not arise accidentally. On the contrary, I show that …rms have the incentive to engineer fragmented capital structures to exploit valuation disagreements, because it can minimize their cost of capital. As the EFH example illustrates, two types of fragmentation can arise. One type is vertical fragmentation, in which debt is issued in tranches with di¤erent levels of seniority. Another type, and the focus of this paper, is horizontal fragmentation, in which subsets of assets are separated and pledged to a subset of the …rm's investors. A standard example of horizontal fragmentation is a secured lender taking a subset of the …rm's assets as collateral, while other investors …nance the …rm's remaining assets. More sophisticated examples of this kind of fragmentation include yieldcos and master limited parnerships in the energy industry, and real estate spino¤s in the retail industry. The common elements of these deals are the creation of a subsidiary, the transfer of a subset of the assets into the sub, with di¤erent investors …nancing the sub and the parent.
Why do managers believe that selling assets to an entity they control can create value for shareholders? Tellingly, yieldco and related deals are often justi…ed as lowering cost of capital by "unlocking value" 3 in a subset of the …rm's assets that are currently undervalued by the parent company's shareholders. Another commonly-used term is "multiple arbitrage" 4 , since the segment is predicted to trade at a higher multiple of earnings than the parent nearly derailed a sale to Time Warner that all parties wanted (Baird 2016) . 3 As an example of this kind of justi…cation, the hedge fund Starboard Value recently proposed that Macy's spin its real estate into two separate joint ventures to "unlock" the value in its real estate, which is being "underappreciated" by the stock market. They propose one JV to hold its iconic properties and one to hold its mall properties: "Macy's could partner with di¤erent parties for each JV, therefore maximizing the value of each JV, as certain parties may be willing to pay more for the iconic properties versus the mall locations, or vice versa."
Starboard Value, "Unlocking Value at Macy's", January 11, 2016. 4 As an example, the plan to split o¤ the real estate in the Caesars reorganization was justi…ed this way:
"The REIT plan potentially could make the company more valuable," said Alex Bumazhny, Fitch Ratings 
Horizontal Fragmentation
Suppose the …rm uses two assets, A and B, and must borrow 200 from creditors to begin operating. After it begins operating, the …rm may succeed or go bankrupt. If it goes bankrupt, the lenders can either liquidate it piecemeal, or sell the company as a going-concern to a third party. All lenders agree that the company will be worth 100 in a going-concern sale, and that the going-concern value of the company clearly exceeds the liquidation value.
Creditors disagree, however, about the value of asset A: Creditor 1 believes that asset A would be worth 60 in liquidation, while Creditor 2 believes that A's liquidation value is only 30. Should bankruptcy occur, both parties also believe they can convince a judge that their valuation of asset A is the correct one.
First, suppose the …rm borrows from only one creditor. In bankruptcy, that creditor expects to sell the company for 100, so the single creditor expects a 50% recovery on its loan of 200. Now suppose the …rm borrows 100 from Creditor 1 and gives this lender a non-recourse 7 5 In this paper I apply the belief-neutral welfare criterion in Brunnermeier, Simsek and Xiong (2014) , which suggests that an allocation is ine¢ cient if total welfare is lower under any convex combination of the agents'beliefs. 6 In e¤ect, the bankruptcy valuation game is very similar to the motivating example in Brunnermeier, Simsek and Xiong (2014) of the two economists who make a bet on the type of …ber in a pillow, and destroy the pillow in order to determine who wins the bet. 7 Non-recourse means that if a default occurs, and the creditor is owed more than the value of the collateral, the creditor is entitled to only the collateral value and nothing more. A recourse secured loan, by contrast, would entitle the creditor to an unsecured claim for the de…ciency (the di¤erence between the amount owed secured loan backed by asset A. It also borrows 100 from Creditor 2, who takes unsecured debt. In bankruptcy, if the company is sold as a going concern, the non-recourse secured lender would be entitled to the value of her collateral, while the unsecured creditor is entitled to the remaining company value. Thus, Creditor 1 believes she is entitled to 60 in bankruptcy, while Creditor 2 believes he is entitled to 100 30 = 70, the remaining value after
Creditor 1 is satis…ed. Creditors are mutually aware of the disagreement, so if bankruptcy occurs, they do not expect the other creditor to agree to accept less than her perceived entitlement. Instead, the valuation dispute will be determined in a hearing by the bankruptcy judge when bargaining breaks down. To make a case to the judge that her valuation is correct, suppose that each creditor must spend 10 in professional fees. If both parties believe they can convince the judge about their valuations, then Creditor 1 expects 60 10 = 50, while Creditor 2 expects 70 10 = 60. Thus, the total perceived creditor recovery is 110/200 = 55%, and the …rm can borrow at a commensurately lower rate ex-ante 8 .
Note that the two creditor outcome is socially less e¢ cient than the one creditor outcome under either creditor's beliefs about the collateral values. Both creditors believe that the creditors will collectively recover 80 (the sale value of 100 less 20 in attorney fees) no matter what the judge decides. But the dispute to decide how the value is divided is socially wasteful.
Reorganization Versus Sale
Another option in bankruptcy is a reorganization, whereby the parties can allocate themselves securities in the ongoing company instead of selling the company for cash. Suppose that after emerging from bankruptcy, the company will produce a cash ‡ow of 150 if it reand the collateral value). Though the result is sharper (and the math simpler) with a non-recourse loan, a traditional (recourse) secured loan creates the same e¤ects. Subsidiaries are necessary to create a true non-recourse loan, as will be discussed below. 8 For the sake of concreteness and simplicity, this example assumes that the creditors have complete foresight about how the bankruptcy valuation dispute will play out when they lend, and that collateral values are always determined by the bankruptcy judge. These assumptions are not essential to generate incentives to fragment the capital structure ex-ante. Creditors need only have di¤erent beliefs about the assets they lend against, and a belief they will receive their perceived entitlement somehow in default (whether by a sale, reorganization, or liquidation). I discuss the sale/reorganization/liquidation decision under disagreement in Section 5.
covers, and only asset A if it fails (suppose that asset B has zero liquidation value in failure).
Recovery and failure occur with equal probability. Both parties expect the value of A to decline by 10: Creditor 1 believes it will decline to 60 10 = 50, while Creditor 2 believes it will decline to 30 10 = 20.
Since Creditor 1 is more optimistic about asset A, a natural way to allocate securities in the ongoing …rm is for Creditor 2 to give Creditor 1 a debt contract backed by asset A, and keep the equity (the residual claim on the company) for himself. suggests …rms should choose simple capital structures to minimize these costs, but this does not seem to square with the increasingly complicated capital structures we observe in large public …rms.
There is a large and growing …nance literature using disagreement 11 to explain bubbles.
An early example is Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) , and Bolton Scheinkman and Xiong (2006) analyze the creation of management incentives in this context. Some existing literature uses disagreement to explain excessive leverage and/or tranching of cash ‡ows to fuel asset price bubbles, including Fostel and Geanakoplos (2012) , and many others. Simsek (2013) shows that the nature of disagreement matters for asset prices and margins. I …nd a qualitatively similar result related to law: the nature of disagreement can a¤ect whether too much reorganization or liquidation occurs in bankruptcy. Ortner and Schmalz (2016) considers capital structure design in the presence of disagreement and generates vertical fragmentation (tranching) when investors have di¤erent beliefs. Ortner and Schmalz (2016) does not generate excess horizontal fragmentation, and it does not focus on the e¤ects of disagreement on the costs of resolving …nancial distress, as I do here.
In the law and economics literature, disagreement has been used to motivate contract terms such as purchase price adjustments in merger agreements (Choi 2017) , the diversity of corporate ownership and control structures (Goshen and Hamdani 2016) and settlement contracting in the shadow of litigation (Spier and Prescott 2016) . Similar to Spier and Prescott, disagreement in my model gives rise to excessive costly litigation in equilibrium.
The paper also relates to the literature on subsidiary legal entities. Most of the law and economics explanations focus on e¢ ciency reasons for subsidiaries, such as creditor monitoring economies (Hansmann and Kraakman 2000) , limiting adverse selection (Hill 1996, Iacobucci and Winter 2005) , transferability (Ayotte and Hansmann 2013) or agency costs (Baird and Casey 2014 , Casey 2015 , Iacobucci and Triantis 2007 . This paper is unlike the preceding papers in that it gives a rationale for the socially excessive use of subsidiaries.
Examples of the latter include Squire (2011) and Ayotte (2017) . But these theories explain excessive subsidiaries by arguing that they can redistribute value from the …rm's other cred-11 See Morris (2005) for a general discussion about the common prior assumption, from which this and other papers depart. 
Setup
Suppose that the model takes place over two dates, 1 and 2. At date 1, the owner (E) starts a project requiring the use of assets A and B. The owner has no personal wealth, so at date 1 she must raise enough to cover the cost of acquiring the assets and the transaction cost of issuing claims on the …rm. Let I(n) denote the total required up-front …nancing need, which is increasing in n, the number of claims issued. At date 2, success or default is realized.
The probability of success is p and success pays X 2 > I(1). Let n denote the incremental cost of issuing n claims instead of n 1. I suppose that n is non-decreasing in n:
In default, the company must decide whether to continue as a going-concern, or liquidate.
Let V and L represent the going-concern and liquidation values of the company, respectively.
The liquidation value is comprised solely of assets A and B: L = a + b: Both the liquidation and going concern values may be subject to disagreement among investors. I will use tildas and subscripts to denote beliefs where valuations may disagree, i.e.ã i denotes party i's belief about the value of asset A.
To abstract away from ex-ante …nancing constraints, I assume the project is always positive NPV under any course of action in default under 1 creditor and any belief: pX 2 + (1 p) minfL i ;Ṽ i g > I(1) for all i: Also, assume the recovery is never enough to cover the …nancing cost: maxfL i ;Ṽ i g < I(1): A timeline is provided in Figure 1 .
I restrict consideration to capital structures where the outside funding is in the form of debt, since it is well known that debt is the optimal contract in a variety of settings 12 . With outside debt and the parameter assumptions above, E always gets 0 in the default state, so E's objective is to maximize the equity payo¤ in success plus any excess funds raised at date 1:
where F is the total payo¤ to all creditors and M is the total amount raised from all creditors. Suppose all creditors are competitive so they will lend as long as they break even in expectation according to their beliefs. The creditor break-even constraint for any creditor i is given by
whereR i is creditor i's perceived total recovery, and
It is easy to show that maximizing the debtor's objective subject to the creditor participation constraints is equivalent to maximizing the creditors'perceived total recovery given their beliefs, less the cost of …nancing:
12 Adding an ex-ante unobservable e¤ort choice by E that increases p will result in E receiving zero in an optimal contract with creditors under these assumptions.
Horizontal Fragmentation
In this section, I consider a simple setup that illustrates the potential for excess horizontal fragmentation and generates some comparative statics. Suppose for this section that the value of the …rm as a going-concern (V ) is commonly known to all parties. Beliefs about the liquidation values of assets A and B can take two values:ã i 2 fa h ; a l g;b i 2 fb h ; b l g with a h > a l ; b h > b l : Without loss of generality, let asset A be the asset with stronger disagreement: a h a l b h b l : I suppose for now that V > a h + b h : to focus on asset valuation disputes within the …rm, I assume that keeping the …rm alive is commonly known to be the best course for the company: I relax this assumption later in the paper.
A creditor's belief is a pair fã i ;b i g: I will use the notation fL; Hg to represent a creditor
I allow for the possibility that some beliefs may not be held by any creditor. But if a creditor holds a particular belief, then the supply of credit is perfectly elastic for that belief;
i.e the creditor is willing to lend any amount that allows him to break even in expectation given his belief. I assume that creditors'beliefs are common knowledge when they bargain.
Bargaining and Recoveries in Default
Suppose that the parties have an opportunity to bargain in distress or invoke a costly hearing to value the assets in dispute. The hearing costs i for creditor i; this represents the legal costs of hiring experts to argue for the creditor's preferred value: Let = X i i : Letk ij denote creditor i's belief about creditor j's collateral value.
Under U.S. bankruptcy law, a secured creditor in bankruptcy who is owed F and has collateral worth k is entitled to a secured claim equal to minfF; kg and an unsecured claim for the de…ciency (maxfF k; 0g): Secured claims are entitled to receive full payment based on the appraised collateral value, while unsecured claims share pro-rata over the remaining …rm value after the secured claims are satis…ed. If the …rm is insolvent, i.e. if F > V , then a creditor who believes she will be undersecured (if F i >k ii ) will expect the following recovery if she expects to litigate over the value of the claim:
ij , is creditor i's belief about the unsecured value (the total …rm value available to satisfy unsecured claims after secured claims are paid), and~ ii =
is creditor i's belief about the pro-rata fraction of the unsecured value it will receive.
It is easy to show thatR i is increasing ink ii : Intuitively, a creditor's recovery is increasing in her own perceived collateral value, since she is entitled to 100 cents on the dollar for collateralized value and less than 100 cents on the dollar for the unsecured de…ciency claim.
For similar reasons, it is decreasing in her beliefs about the value of the other creditors' collateral X j6 =ik ij ; since the other creditors' collateralized value reduces the pool of money available to satisfy unsecured claims.
Litigation over valuation will occur if and only if the parties believe they are collectively better o¤ litigating; that is, whenever X iR i > V: This will occur whenever the parties' collective overvaluation of the bankruptcy recovery exceeds the total deadweight cost of litigation; i.e. whenever X ik ii +~ iiŨi V > : 13 Otherwise, the parties will bargain to a division of the value in the shadow of the valuation …ght, and the total perceived recovery will be the going-concern value V:
The optimal capital structure will depend on the set of available creditor beliefs. First, consider the case in which there are two creditor types with di¤erent beliefs about one of the two assets. This leads to a capital structure in which the asset with value disagreement is split o¤ and …nanced through a non-recourse loan:
Proposition 1 Suppose there is disagreement only about asset A. If a h a l > ; and the incremental …nancing cost 2 is below a cuto¤ value 2 , then an optimal capital structure for E is a 2 creditor capital structure such that:
13 I assume Coasean bargaining here, so that agreement is reached whenever it is mutually bene…cial. The distribution of surplus is not particularly important here, since only the total payo¤s matter for a discussion of e¢ ciency.
a) The creditor who values asset A more makes a non-recourse secured loan backed by asset A with F a h ;
b) The other creditor makes a recourse loan against the remaining …rm value, with F V a l :
Otherwise, the optimal capital structure is a one creditor capital structure and the creditor type is irrelevant.
All proofs are located in the Appendix.
The idea behind the proposition is that E can minimize its cost of funds by giving creditors the largest perceived total recovery. Intuitively, this involves pledging the asset values to the lenders who value them most highly. Less intuitively, it also requires giving the more optimistic creditor a non-recourse claim backed by that asset 14 . The non-recourse claim allows the other (recourse) creditor to capture all of the remaining …rm value. This is optimal for E because the recourse creditor values the remaining …rm value at V a l , while the non-recourse creditor values it at V a h :
Remark 1. U.S. law makes it di¢ cult to create non-recourse debt in a reorganization;
the Bankruptcy Code automatically converts non-recourse debt to recourse when the debtor keeps the collateral in a reorganization 15 . This means that creating a true non-recourse structure requires placing the non-recourse collateral into a separate subsidiary. (There are many equivalent ways to design the recourse claim-one way is for the recourse creditor to take an unsecured claim against the parent company, which holds asset B). Hence, the model explains why legal separation of assets into clusters of subsidiaries can result from disagreement.
Remark 2. In a world where separate entities are not possible, this model may give an e¢ ciency rationale for the conversion of non-recourse debt into recourse. It minimizes the sort of zero-sum valuation bets that the debtor tries to create by weakening the relationship between the court's valuation of the collateral and the parties'payo¤s. Hence, it reduces the gains from fragmenting the capital structure ex-ante. Of course, where separate entities are 14 A non-recourse claim is a claim against only the collateral and not to the rest of the balance sheet; thus, a creditor owed F backed by collateral worth k is entitled to only minfF; kg: 15 11 U.S.C. 1111(b) (1) possible, this provision is irrelevant at best, and at worst harmful, as it has the unintended consequence of giving the debtor incentive to create too many subsidiaries.
Corollary 2 Suppose there are two creditor groups who disagree about the value of both assets.
a) If the creditor who is more optimistic about A is more pessimistic about B, then the optimal capital structure is the same as in Proposition 1.
b) If the same creditor is more optimistic about both assets, a h + b h a l b l > , and 2 is su¢ ciently low, then that creditor makes a non-recourse loan against both assets, and the other creditor makes a recourse loan against the remaining …rm value.
If a third creditor exists who is pessimistic about both assets, then a three creditor capital structure can be optimal:
Proposition 3 Suppose the set of available creditors is { H; Lg; fL; Hg; fL; Lgg: Then if 3 is below a cuto¤ value 3 , the optimal capital structure is a 3 creditor capital structure such that:
a) The creditor with belief { H; Lg (fL; Hg) lends non-recourse secured debt with face value F a h (b h ) against asset A (B).
b) The creditor with belief fL; Lg makes a recourse loan against the remaining …rm value, with F V a l b l :
When a creditor appears with a more pessimistic valuation of the collateral (i.e. a larger estimate of the unsecured value), E will concentrate the unsecured value in that creditor.
This can result in a 3 creditor capital structure if the up-front …nancing costs are su¢ ciently low.
Remark 3. Again, as a legal matter, since non-recourse debt can not be created by contract, this would require creating a parent company and two subsidiaries, one to hold each asset. The parent company issues unsecured debt to creditor fL; Lg, and each subsidiary issues (secured) debt backed by the asset in that sub. This resembles the EFH capital structure discussed in the introduction-the regulated and unregulated electricity units were held in subsidiaries with their own non-recourse debt under a parent company that had its own debt. The parent debt is structurally junior to the debt at the subsidiary units and hence captures the unsecured value.
The Corollary suggests comparative statics that drive the horizontal fragmentation decision:
Corollary 4 The cuto¤ values 2 ; 3 are a) weakly increasing in a h a l and b h b l and b) strictly decreasing in p:
Firms optimally choose more fragmented capital structures when there is greater disagreement about asset values, and when the probability of bankruptcy is higher.
The Corollary tells us that fragmented capital structures are more likely when the potential for disagreement about asset values is high and the probability of bankruptcy is high.
Thus, we might expect to see more fragmentation following highly leveraged transactions and when the …rm owns the types of assets that are likely to generate asset bubbles. The recent wave of bankruptcies in the energy sector provide a recent example consistent with these motivations. SunEdison was one of many energy producers to create separate subsidiaries called "yieldcos". This practice crested in 2013 when oil prices were high and interest rates were low, allowing for the creation of high yielding securities. SunEdison created two publicly traded subsidiaries (Terraform Power and Terraform Global) that were set up to purchase power projects from the parent company after they were up and running and had secured long-term contracts from utilities to provide power. The subsidiaries …-nanced themselves with debt and stock that promised a high dividend yield. The parent retained majority voting rights over the subs and management duties with respect to the power projects.
Di¤erent stories emerged about the value of the two pieces. To optimists, the yieldcos provided a carve-out of safe assets from an otherwise risky company, because they involve existing projects backed by long-term power contracts. Others argued that these structures were set up to feed a bubble in higher-yielding investments by engineering securities with high current interest payments and dividend yields that were ultimately not sustainable 16 .
When oil prices and the prices of yieldco stocks fell dramatically in 2015, the creation of new yieldcos stopped, and practitioners refer to this episode as the bursting of a "yieldco bubble" 17 . The SunEdison bankruptcy has proven complex and rife with litigation due to its complicated …nancial structure and the uncertain cash ‡ow and control rights as between the parent company and its yieldcos.
18

Asset Allocation in Bankruptcy
The previous section assumed that the going concern value is known to exceed liquidation value by enough that keeping the assets together is always preferred by the parties, and we supposed that V was realized instantaneously, as if the …rm were sold as a going concern for cash. In this section, I consider the asset allocation decision in bankruptcy-whether to sell the company as a going-concern, liquidate it, or reorganize it by issuing securities against the reorganized …rm to the pre-bankruptcy creditors. This section yields two additional important insights. First, it highlights a new bene…t to corporate reorganization in the presence of horizontal fragmentation: the ability to distribute securities instead of cash can mitigate the tendency to …ght over valuation. Second, it demonstrates that disagreement can lead to socially excessive liquidation when investors disagree about a …rm's component assets. 
Project and bargaining game setup
Figure 2: Continuation Timeline
To make a discussion of a reorganization option nontrivial, I allow the parties to distribute securities in the ongoing …rm at date 2, with a …nal random payo¤ that is realized at Date 3. In the recovery state at Date 3, the …rm produces a high cash ‡ow X 3 with probability p 2 : The failure state occurs with probability (1 p 2 ) and produces only the collateral, which falls in value by a commonly known multiplicative factor < 1; so the total payo¤ in failure is (a + b): The parameters p 2 , X 3 , and are assumed to be common knowledge, but the collateral values a and b are subject to disagreement, as before.
Suppose that parameter values are such that the optimal capital structure involves a full recourse creditor and a non-recourse creditor who lends against asset A, as in Propositions 1 and 2. Let creditor i be the recourse creditor and creditor j be the non-recourse creditor.
To focus on interesting cases, suppose that i weakly values asset B more, and j strictly values A more; i.e.b i b j ; andã i <ã j : Thus, creditor j makes a non-recourse loan against asset A. The bargaining process works as follows. I assume that i (the recourse creditor) controls the bankruptcy estate, and thus makes an initial o¤er of a course of action (reorganization, sale, or liquidation) and a payo¤. The payo¤ can be in the form of securities in the ongoing …rm if reorganization is chosen; otherwise, it is a cash o¤er to divide the proceeds of the sold assets. If the o¤er is refused, creditor i decides whether to pursue a nonconsensual ("cramdown") reorganization, a cramdown sale, or a liquidation. In a cramdown sale or
Creditor i offers a disposition (reorganization, sale, liquidation) and payoff .
Creditor j accepts or rejects. If acceptance occurs, the parties receive their payoffs and no valuation dispute occurs.
If rejection occurs, Creditor i chooses disposition. If reorg or sale is chosen, parties contest valuation. Final proceeds are allocated.
Offer Phase
Cramdown Phase Acceptance Phase Figure 3 : Bargaining game with asset allocation cramdown reorganization, the parties …rst litigate over the value of a, to determine the value of the parties'entitlements. In a cramdown sale, a third party buys the …rm (the date 3 payo¤) for a price P (this will be discussed below), and the judge's valuation determines how P is shared.
In a cramdown reorganization, creditor i proposes a debt contract to creditor j that pays F in recovery and asset A in failure 19 . The judge's valuation will determine the value of a, which will in turn identify F . After the judge's value is set, F will be set so that creditor j's claim is worth a in expected value; that is, it will satisfy p 2 F + (1 p 2 ) a = a: Creditor i will receive the remaining value of the company, p 2 (X F ) + (1 p 2 ) b: A timeline of the bargaining game is provided above.
Cramdown Phase
Working backward, if an o¤er is rejected, Creditor i will choose to maximize her perceived expected payo¤. In a cramdown sale, a buyer will pay some price P . The going-concern sale price may depend on many factors, such as market liquidity/illiquidity, and the transaction costs of sales versus reorganizations; to focus on the e¢ ciency of the allocation decision from the …rm's point of view, I simply assume that P is exogenous and commonly known.
Creditor i expects that the judge will agree with her perceived value of asset A,ã i : Hence, in a cramdown sale, RC expects a payo¤ of
In a cramdown reorganization, Creditor i expects her perceived value of the company after Creditor j receives a claim worthã i : Thus, i 0 s expected payo¤ isṼ i ã i i ; wherẽ
Finally, in a liquidation absent an agreement, both parties walk away with their assets, so Creditor i expectsb i :
To summarize, the perceived expected payo¤s for Creditor i following a rejected o¤er under each outcome (cramdown reorganization, cramdown sale, liquidation) is fCR; CS; Lg = fṼ i ã i i ; P ã i i ;b i g and creditor i will choose the maximum of these payo¤s.
Acceptance Phase
In the acceptance phase, the lowest possible o¤er that creditor j will accept depends on creditor i's expected decision at the cramdown phase. If j expects that i will choose a cramdown (either sale or reorganization), then j will accept any o¤er with a perceived payo¤ of at leastã j j : If a liquidation is expected, then j will demand at leastã j : For economy of notation, let be an indicator that equals 1 if a cramdown sale or cramdown reorganization is expected in that phase and 0 otherwise. Hence, creditor j expects a payo¤ ofã j j :
O¤er Phase
Anticipating the acceptance phase, creditor i will consider each action by calculating the highest settlement payo¤ that j will accept under each action. Then creditor i will choose an action by comparing the three settlement payo¤s to the three payo¤s under the cramdown phase.
The best o¤er that creditor j will accept will give creditor i a perceived payo¤ of P ã j + j in a sale andb i + j in a liquidation. In a reorganization, an acceptable o¤er to j is an o¤er of a secured debt contract, backed by asset A, with face value F that provides creditor j with at least as much as j would get after a rejection:
Note that from creditor i 0 s perspective, creditor j overvalues his default payo¤ ã j : This results in more favorable terms in the debt contract F . Solving, we get
Creditor i's expected payo¤ is p 2 (X F ) + (1 p 2 ) b i . Plugging in the expression for F above, creditor i's payo¤ can be expressed as
By inspecting this expression, we can see the bene…ts of bargaining with securities in reorganization. From creditor i's perspective, creditor j demands less in a reorganization than in a sale. In a sale, creditor j demands a claim worthã j j ; his payo¤ in the cramdown phase. But if a reorganization is o¤ered, j will settle for a claim on the …rm that i believes is worth onlyã j j (1 p 2 ) (ã j ã i ): From i 0 s perspective, j overvalues securities he receives in a reorganization o¤er. This has the e¤ect of increasing the bargaining surplus between the parties and encouraging settlement. To summarize, creditor i 0 s maximum payo¤ under settlement for each of the three outcomes (settlement reorganization, settlement sale and settlement liquidation) is
The outcome will be the outcome that generates the largest payo¤ for creditor i under the six options above, fSR; SS; SLg and fCR; CS; Lg:
We are now ready to discuss a few key properties of the equilibria of the bargaining game.
Proposition 5 Ine¢ cient liquidations can occur if there is su¢ cient disagreement about both assets (ã i >ã j ;b i <b j ) and is su¢ ciently high.
This Proposition shows that horizontal fragmentation can lead to socially excessive liquidation. When there is disagreement about both assets, it is possible to haveã j +b i > maxfṼ i ;Ṽ j ; P g > maxfã i +b i ;ã j +b j g: Under these parameters, if is high enough, the parties prefer to walk away with their collateral than …ght for their perceived entitlement in a cramdown reorganization or sale, and they disagree too much about the value of their asset to settle. Yet, they may both believe that the liquidation outcome is ine¢ cient, and was caused by the other creditor's overvaluation of her asset.
Lemma 6 (Reorganization encourages settlement.) There exist > 0 for which SR > CR but CS > SS: the parties would prefer to settle under a reorganization but would litigate valuation under a going concern sale. The measure of for which these conditions hold is larger when failure following reorganization is more likely (lower p 2 ) and when asset A depreciates less (lower ):
To see this, note that reorganization with settlement is preferred to cramdown reorganization (SR > CR) if and only if
which reduces to
At the same time, a cramdown sale is preferred by the parties to a sale with settlement (CS > SS) if and only if
which reduces toã
The lemma holds when (1) and (2) hold simultaneously:
Note that the increase in the parties'perceived total payo¤s from litigating are greater in a sale (ã j ã i ) than in a reorganization ((1 (1 p 2 ) )(ã j ã i )). This occurs because the reorganization bargain gives creditor j a payo¤ in the failure state that she values more than creditor i: Parties litigate when the total perceived payo¤ under litigation exceeds the total perceived payo¤ under settlement by more than the total litigation cost. The more likely is the failure state (1 p 2 ), and the less asset A depreciates ( ), the greater is the disagreement between creditors i and j about the value of j's claim under settlement, and hence the greater is the total perceived payo¤ under settlement.
The lemma leads directly into a discussion on the e¢ ciency consequences of sale versus reorganization in the presence of disagreement and horizontal fragmentation:
Proposition 7 (E¢ ciency and ine¢ ciency in the reorganization versus sale decision).
a) A reorganization can potentially increase e¢ ciency by preventing a valuation …ght that would occur under a sale; b) Nevertheless, the parties may choose an ine¢ cient sale with valuation …ght over a reorganization with settlement.
Part (a) of the Proposition says that even whenṼ k P for k = fi; jg (reorganization does not produce greater value than sale, before litigation costs), it can increase e¢ ciency through litigation cost savings. This occurs when the inequalities underlying Lemma 6, (3) are satis…ed, and reorganization is e¢ cient, inclusive of litigation costs, under the beliefs of both creditors:
But Part (b) of the Proposition makes clear that these conditions do not necessarily mean that the parties will choose reorganization when it is e¢ cient. Speci…cally, when CS > SR :
the parties will choose the cramdown sale over the consensual reorganization. Since the right hand side is positive whenever SR > CR, an ine¢ cient sale occurs only if P Ṽ i > 0:
ForṼ i su¢ ciently close to P , the e¢ cient reorganization will be chosen by the parties. Part (b) of the Proposition suggests that an optimal bankruptcy law may need to tip the balance toward reorganizations over sales in a horizontal fragmentation context due to the litigation that a sale may produce.
Turning the …rm into cash creates proceeds to which the parties attach a common value.
Hence, there is no potential for allocating securities that the recipient values more than the issuer. This hardens the parties' bargaining positions, and may lead the parties to choose an ine¢ cient going-concern sale combined with a valuation dispute, rather than a consensual reorganization. Another way to characterize the bene…ts of reorganization is that reorganization facilitates agreement over a plan by allowing the parties to continue "agreeing to disagree" about the values of their claims. By postponing the resolution of their dispute on asset valuation, the parties may save themselves an unnecessary costly …ght if the company recovers, while continuing to believe they have received their legal entitlements when the company exits bankruptcy.
Bankruptcy lawyers often use this insight in practice to forestall valuation …ghts by allocating securities to the parties whose value depends on subsequent realizations of asset values about which the parties disagree (Huebner and Schiable 2009) 20 . Moreover, the Bankruptcy Code in many places guides the parties toward securities that are backed by the same assets the parties …nanced before the bankruptcy. For example, in a cramdown reorganization, a secured creditor must receive not only a new note whose present value is the value of the secured creditor's claim, but also the new note must be secured and backed 20 Huebner and Schiable (2009) discuss the Conseco bankruptcy reorganization, in which the senior creditors were given convertible securities and the junior creditors were given equity. After a future date, if the junior creditors were not able to redeem the senior creditors' claims at par, the convertibles would e¤ectively wipe out the juniors'claims. Though this disagreement was about …rm value V in a senior/junior capital structure, the same principle applies in this model.
by the same collateral the creditor …nanced before bankruptcy. One bene…t of channeling the bargaining in this way is to tie payo¤s to the assets the creditors value more highly.
Another is the 1111(b)(2) election 21 , which allows a creditor the option to treat its entire claim as secured. If the creditor makes this election, it gives up a potentially valuable de…ciency claim on the …rm, but allows the creditor a greater upside value in the collateral that may be realized after bankruptcy.
Conclusion
Existing theories in corporate …nance have di¢ culty explaining the complexity of the capital structures we observe in large …rms. Large public company capital structures are often char- This paper takes a …rst step toward explaining some of these patterns. My theory argues that complex capital structures can be a deliberate product of …nancial engineering by owners to take advantage of di¤erences in beliefs among investors. Bankruptcy law confers both priority and control rights based on the value of individual assets that make up a …rm. These values are not always easily veri…able and often require costly, contested valuation hearings to establish. Firms in the model have incentive to fragment the capital structure by creating targeted claims to subsets of the …rm's assets that some investors are more optimistic about than others. These strategies are often described as "unlocking value" in assets that are 21 In the 1111(b)(2) election, the secured creditor has the option to treat its entire claim as secured. In doing so, it gives up any de…ciency claim on the …rm, but keeps a lien equal to its total pre-bankruptcy claim; this means that if the collateral is later sold or the company is liquidated for more than the value of the collateral as determined at bankruptcy, the secured creditor can keep the full realized value of the collateral.
underappreciated by the …rm's current investors. This strategy can minimize a …rm's all-in cost of debt …nancing and thus maximize the value of equity. But when distress occurs, the disagreement about the …rm's asset values leads to valuation disputes that are socially costly. Hence, the model gives a reason for socially excessive horizontal fragmentation, i.e.
excessive subsidiaries and other forms of asset-based …nancing.
I
have not yet explored the normative consequences of the theory for bankruptcy law design. The model suggests that capital structures that create zero-sum valuation disputes, particularly when the value is unclear and costly to establish, should be discouraged. For example, the value of a a full-recourse secured loan is less sensitive to the judicial valuation of collateral than a non-recourse loan because the de…ciency claim increases as the collateral value falls. The model may suggest that the time is ripe for rethinking valuation methods in bankruptcy. The current state of a¤airs allows for competing experts to argue not only about inputs to valuations (discount rates, etc) but also valuation methods (discounted cash ‡ow, transaction multiples, etc.) 22 . Ayotte and Morrison (2018) …nd that disputes over these inputs are common, and that judges can be persuaded to adopt assumptions that have no basis in …nance theory or evidence. More standardized, and perhaps more "quick and dirty" valuation processes that are also more predictable may be superior to costly valuations that are more subject to disagreement and dispute. Of course, the bene…ts of avoiding costly disputes ex-post need to be traded o¤ against the ex-ante bene…ts of targeting claims to the true value of assets, such as the avoidance of asset substitution problems and the like. As noted above, an optimal capital structure maximizes (1 p) X iR i
Appendix
I(n):
Consider a partitioning of the company's asset value upon bankruptcy into two mutually exclusive parts: the collateral value of asset A, and the value of the di¤erence between the …rm's reorganization value (V ) and the sum of the collateral values. If each piece has a perceived value to its holder(s) that is maximal given set of the available beliefs, then the total perceived …rm value (equivalently, the perceived total recovery), gross of restructuring costs, is maximized for that partitioning. Further, it is clear that no …ner partition can increase perceived …rm value given that the only source of disagreement is over the value of asset A.
Clearly, the maximum perceived value of asset A is a h , which is achieved by giving a non-recourse debt claim backed by asset A with F > a h . And the perceived unsecured value is V ã is maximized by placing it with the creditor who values it at V a l .
If a h a l > , which is the necessary condition for cramdown to occur, then under this capital structure, the perceived total recovery, net of restructuring costs is
If this holds, then the two creditor capital structure is optimal if and only if (1 p)(a h a l ) > 2 : If a h a l < then the parties settle in bargaining and the value of the …rm is V under any capital structure, so a 1 creditor capital structure is optimal and since all parties agree on V , the creditor's beliefs are irrelevant. 
Thus, the perceived value is maximized by giving the fH; Lg type a non-recourse claim to asset A, while the fL; Hg type takes a non-recourse claim to asset B plus the unsecured value. But this is equivalent to giving the fL; Hg type the entire …rm value less the value of A. The total perceived recovery is
Part (b): Using the same logic in part (a), the highest perceived value is achieved by giving the fH; Hg type a non-recourse claim to A and B, and the fL; Lg type the remaining unsecured value. The parties will litigate rather than settle if and only if a h + b h + (V a l b l ) > V , which reduces to the inequality in the Corollary.
Proposition 3:
Similar to Corollary 2, except that the unsecured value is maximized by allocating it to the fL; Lg creditor, who values it at V a l b l : The total perceived recovery is
The highest possible two-creditor recovery is V + a h a l , so a three-creditor capital structure will be preferred to a two creditor structure if and only if
Corollary 4:
(sketch) An optimal capital structure maximizes (1 p) X iR i I(n). Hence, the cuto¤ value can be expressed as the di¤erence in …nancing cost that makes the …rm indi¤erent between n creditors and n 1 : n = (1 p)( X Proposition 5:
Su¢ cient conditions for liquidation to occur are that SL maxfSR; SS; CR; CSg:
These conditions can be reduced down tõ
For liquidation to be ine¢ cient, it must be that both parties believe that at least one of the alternative outcomes (sale or reorganization) increases aggregate utility:
Combining these conditions,
Parameter values exist such that these inequalities can hold, but the …rst (second) inequality can hold only ifã j ã i (b i b j ) is su¢ ciently high, and the third inequality can hold only if is su¢ ciently high.
For Lemma 6 and Proposition 7, a sketch of the proofs is provided in the text. 
